Of Wild Beasts and Digital Analogues: The Legal Status of Autonomous Systems by Scherer, Matthew U.
19 NEV. L.J. 259, SCHERER  1/28/2019  11:58 AM 
 
259 
OF WILD BEASTS AND DIGITAL 
ANALOGUES: THE LEGAL STATUS OF 
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
Matthew U. Scherer 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................  260 
I. PERSONHOOD....................................................................................  260 
A. What Is Legal Personhood? ......................................................  260 
B. Should A.I. Systems Have Legal Personhood? ..........................  262 
II. DOES A.I. PERSONHOOD ALREADY EXIST? ........................................  264 
A. New York ...................................................................................  265 
1. LLC Members and Managers Must be Persons..................  267 
2. The Limitations on Operating Agreements Under New 
York Law .............................................................................  269 
3. Purpose of the LLC Statute .................................................  270 
4. Section 608 and the Real Meaning of § 701(a)(4) ..............  271 
5. Conclusion ..........................................................................  272 
B. The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(RULLCA) .................................................................................  273 
1. The Text of RULLCA ..........................................................  274 
2. Enacted Statutes Based on RULLCA ..................................  276 
C. Conclusion ..................................................................................  277 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO A.I. PERSONHOOD: DIGITAL ANALOGUES ..........  279 
A. Products ....................................................................................  280 
B. Animals ......................................................................................  281 
C. Children .....................................................................................  283 
D. Agents ........................................................................................  285 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................  290 
                                                        
  Associate, Littler Mendelson P.C., and member of Littler’s Workplace Policy Institute and 
Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Automation practice group. The author thanks Mohsen 
Manesh for his feedback on this article, which began as a series of blog posts on 
LawAndAI.com. 
19 NEV. L.J. 259, SCHERER  1/28/2019  11:58 AM 
260 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The emerging legal issues surrounding artificial intelligence (A.I.) have 
become a fruitful ground for legal scholarship over the past few years. One of 
the hottest topics within that broader subject is the concept of “A.I. person-
hood.” The usual framing of the issue is: “Should we grant ‘personhood’ to A.I. 
systems and give them legal recognition in the same way that the law recogniz-
es corporations and natural persons?” Given the rapid advances in A.I. over the 
past few years and the increasing number of tasks that automated systems are 
called upon to perform, this is hardly an idle question. 
In fact, several legal academics in the past few years have gone one step 
beyond discussing whether A.I. personhood should exist and claim that existing 
laws already permit the practical equivalent of A.I. personhood. This article 
asks and answers three questions: (1) Is artificial personhood a good idea? (2) 
Do current laws—most notably the flexible laws governing the creation of 
Limited Liability Companies (LLCs)—already provide a viable path to A.I. 
personhood? (3) If A.I. systems are not persons, what could serve as an ana-
logue for the legal status of A.I. systems? 
This article thus proceeds in three parts. Part I explains what legal person-
hood means and why A.I. systems should not have it—at least, not yet. Part II 
concludes that courts would not construe LLC laws as permitting the creation 
of artificial persons, and that suggestions to the contrary are not merely incor-
rect, but potentially dangerous. Part III examines products liability, animal law, 
and agency law as potential legal analogues for digital persons. It concludes 
that agency law provides the most effective and flexible legal analogue for arti-
ficial systems. 
I. PERSONHOOD 
A. What Is Legal Personhood? 
The concept of personality is fundamental to the conception of law in 
common-law jurisdictions. Our legal system does not care much about non-
persons, except to the extent that they affect the legal rights and responsibilities 
of persons. Natural persons—that is, human beings—are the quintessential ex-
amples of legal persons. Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “law” in its 
broadest sense as “[t]he regime that orders human activities and relations.”1 But 
while natural persons are the most familiar example of legal persons, and the 
ones endowed with the broadest range of legal rights and responsibilities, vari-
ous forms of legal personhood have also been extended to other entities, most 
notably corporations and other business organizations. 
The defining feature of legal persons is the ability to participate in the legal 
system by having the capacity to sue and be sued. Black Law Dictionary specif-
                                                        
1  Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). 
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ically cites this ability to sue and be sued as the defining quality of a “legal en-
tity,” the catch-all term for legal persons who are not human beings.2 Absent 
the ability to sue and be sued, an entity is not a legal entity and therefore is not 
a person in the eyes of the law.3 And because such an entity is not a person, it is 
unable to own property, create an enforceable contract, or engage in any other 
act that entails (or could entail) access to the legal system. As a New York 
court once explained in a case involving a dissolved corporation: 
Every action must have parties competent to sue and be sued, and for and 
against whom a judgment may be rendered. The very existence of a cause of ac-
tion implies that there is some one entitled to sue and some one who may lawful-
ly be sued, and consequently an action cannot be maintained if there is lacking 
either the former or the latter . . . . A civil action can be maintained only in the 
name of a person in law, an entity, which the law of the forum can recognize as 
capable of possessing and asserting a right of action . . . . Thus the rule has been 
formulated that “in all civil actions the prime requisite as to parties is that the 
plaintiff . . . must . . . be either a natural or artificial person”; and that an action 
cannot be maintained in the name of a plaintiff who is not a natural or artificial 
person having legal entity to sue or be used.4 
Corporations are the most familiar class of artificial legal entities. Like 
natural persons, a corporation has the right to enter into contracts, own and dis-
pose of assets, and file lawsuits, all in its own name.5 The other defining feature 
of the corporation is limited liability, which ensures that the owners of a corpo-
ration only stand to lose the amount of money, or capital, that they have invest-
ed in the corporation if it goes under.6 Together, these features give a corpora-
tion a legal existence that is largely separate from its creators and owners. 
The underlying theory of corporate personhood is based on economic and 
(supposedly) social utility. Corporations were granted contract and property 
rights to encourage investment, reduce transaction costs, and facilitate large fi-
nancial and property transactions,7 all of which are made easier by treating a 
corporation as an entity legally separate from its owners. Over time, corpora-
tions have accreted additional rights and responsibilities, which legal systems 
have recognized to promote other economic and social goals. Great controversy 
often surrounds the extension of additional legal rights to corporations, as ex-
                                                        
2  Legal Entity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “legal entity” as “[a] 
body, other than a natural person, that can function legally, sue or be sued, and make deci-
sions through agents.”). 
3  See id. 
4  MacAffer v. Bos. & M.R.R., 273 N.Y.S. 679, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934) (emphasis add-
ed) (citations omitted), rev’d, MacAffer v. Bos. & M.R.R., 197 N.E. 328 (N.Y. 1935). 
5  19 C.J.S. Corporations § 638 (2018). 
6  See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 7 (2018). 
7  See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpo-
ration, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93–101 (1985) (discussing various justifications for corporate 
limited liability). 
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emplified by the polarized reactions to the Supreme Court’s Citizens United 
decision.8 
One additional observation relevant to assessments of the potential scope 
of artificial personhood is that a person or entity must be in active existence to 
have legal personality. Dead or fictitious persons and defunct entities cannot 
file a lawsuit, nor can anyone file suit on their behalf: 
The capacity to sue exists only in persons in being, and not in those who are 
dead or who have not yet been born, and so cannot be brought before the court. 
Thus a proceeding cannot be brought in the name of a deceased plaintiff; such a 
proceeding is a nullity. Thus, where an association has no corporate existence ei-
ther de jure or de facto, . . . it cannot do any act whatever as a legal entity. It 
cannot take title to real or to personal property, convey real property, maintain 
proceedings to condemn land, acquire rights by contract or otherwise, or incur 
debts or other liabilities, either in contract or in tort, unless by operation of an 
estoppel; nor can it sue or be sued . . . . The dissolution of a corporation implies 
its utter extinction and obliteration as a body capable of suing or being sued, or 
in whose favor obligations exist or upon which liabilities are imposed.9 
A dissolved entity thus may have some residual legal existence for the pur-
pose of winding up its affairs, but that is all. It would not have standing to sue 
to vindicate rights the entity might have had when it still was in active exist-
ence. 
B. Should A.I. Systems Have Legal Personhood? 
With this as background, does it make sense to extend some form of legal 
personhood to A.I. systems? In a word: no. There is a key practical distinction 
between A.I. systems on one hand and corporations (and other currently recog-
nized legal entities) on the other. A corporation is a theoretical construct, some-
thing that effectively exists only on paper. A.I. systems, by contrast, actually 
exist in the physical world. A corporation has no ability to do anything without 
the aid of human agents to act on its behalf. An autonomous A.I. system is not 
subject to such inherent limitations. 
The whole point of an autonomous vehicle, weapon, or electronic trading 
system is that they can do things without humans specifically impelling them to 
do so. That potential for greater autonomy and physical presence makes A.I. 
systems seem more human-like than corporations. On a superficial level, that 
might suggest that we should grant A.I. systems at least some form of person-
                                                        
8  See Nina Totenberg, When Did Companies Become People? Excavating the Legal Evolu-
tion, NPR (July 28, 2014, 4:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-did-c 
ompanies-become-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution [https://perma.cc/2HQB-X5F5] 
(“Then came Citizens United, the Supreme Court’s 5-4 First Amendment decision in 2010 
that extended to corporations for the first time full rights to spend money as they wish in 
candidate elections—federal, state and local. The decision reversed a century of legal under-
standing, unleashed a flood of campaign cash and created a crescendo of controversy that 
continues to build today.”). 
9  MacAffer, 273 N.Y.S. at 686. 
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hood. If, after all, we imbue personhood on completely theoretical constructs, 
why should we withhold it from dynamic autonomous systems that actively in-
teract with human beings and engage with the physical world? 
The most obvious riposte to this rhetorical question is that it is precisely 
that potential for greater autonomy that cautions against recognizing A.I. sys-
tems as persons. The autonomy of A.I. systems and their ability to directly ma-
nipulate the physical world raise accountability concerns that far exceed the al-
ready-significant accountability concerns surrounding corporations. With a 
corporation, we can always reassure ourselves that humans are pulling the lev-
ers, even if the corporation is its own “person” in the eyes of the law. No such 
reassurance will be available if we recognize A.I.-based persons. 
True, A.I. systems are already capable of making better decisions than hu-
mans in a surprisingly wide swath of endeavors, particularly in situations with 
high predictability and where erroneous decisions do not cause much harm.10 
But decisions whose outcomes result in legal action often involve a high cost of 
error (such as medical negligence) or a high level of unpredictability (such as 
securities transactions). That means that humans should remain responsible for 
many—if not most—legally significant decisions. 
Personhood would mean that an A.I. system would be legally responsible 
for its own actions. That, in turn, would severely diminish the incentive for 
humans to supervise A.I. systems or otherwise take responsibility for those sys-
tems’ decisions and operations. Consequently, A.I. personhood is not appropri-
ate, and that will remain the case as long as there are legally significant deci-
sions for which we want humans to retain ultimate responsibility. 
This is consistent with the recommendation in Ethically Aligned Design: A 
Vision for Prioritizing Human Wellbeing with Artificial Intelligence and Au-
tonomous Systems (A/IS), which is part of an initiative launched by the Institute 
of Electrical and Electric Engineers (IEEE): 
While conferring legal personhood on A/IS might bring some economic bene-
fits, the technology has not yet developed to the point where it would be legally 
or morally appropriate to generally accord A/IS the rights and responsibilities 
inherent in the legal definition of personhood, as it is defined today. Therefore, 
even absent the consideration of any negative ramifications from personhood 
status, it would be unwise to accord such status to A/IS at this time. A/IS should 
therefore remain to be subject to the applicable regimes of property law.11 
                                                        
10  See Vasant Dhar, When to Trust Robots with Decisions, and When Not to, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (May 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/05/when-to-trust-robots-with-decisions-and-when 
-not-to [https://perma.cc/JD5M-J2Y9]. 
11  INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, ETHICALLY ALIGNED DESIGN: A VISION FOR PRIORITIZING 
HUMAN WELL-BEING WITH AUTONOMOUS AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 149 (2d. ed. 2017). 
Note: The author was chair of the subcommittee that drafted the “Legal Status of A/IS” por-
tion of the EAD document, from which the quoted passage is drawn. The opinions expressed 
herein are solely the author’s and do not reflect the opinion of the IEEE or of any of the 
members of the subcommittee that drafted the relevant portions of the Ethically Aligned De-
sign document. 
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Although the IEEE conclusion on personhood is on-point, its implication 
that A.I. should therefore simply be treated like other forms of human property 
is questionable. Treating A.I. in a manner analogous to consumer products or 
other forms of property does not properly account for the fact that, unlike all 
forms of property that the law recognizes today, A.I. systems are capable of 
making legally significant decisions. This point is discussed in greater depth in 
Sections III.A and III.D, infra. 
II. DOES A.I. PERSONHOOD ALREADY EXIST? 
The issue of whether A.I. personhood is a good idea takes on an entirely 
different tenor if A.I. personhood is already here. In two articles published in 
2014 and 2015, Shawn Bayern argued that it is.12 Specifically, Bayern claims 
that it is possible to create an LLC that is effectively controlled by an autono-
mous system if the LLC’s organizers follow a series of steps: 
(1) an individual member creates a member-managed LLC, filing the appropri-
ate paperwork with the state; (2) the individual (along, possibly, with the LLC, 
which is controlled by the sole member) enters into an operating agreement gov-
erning the conduct of the LLC; (3) the operating agreement specifies that the 
LLC will take actions as determined by an autonomous system, specifying terms 
or conditions as appropriate to achieve the autonomous system’s legal goals; (4) 
the sole member withdraws from the LLC, leaving the LLC without any mem-
bers. The result is potentially a perpetual LLC—a new legal person—that re-
quires no ongoing intervention from any preexisting legal person in order to 
maintain its status.13 
In arguing that these steps could actually lead to the creation of an autono-
mous LLC in practice today, Bayern’s analysis focuses largely—indeed, almost 
exclusively—on two legal sources: New York’s LLC statute and the Revised 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA).14 
The maxim that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” ap-
plies to the laws of men no less than it applies to the laws of nature. The central 
thesis of Bayern’s articles is that it is already possible for an unsupervised arti-
ficial intelligence system to obtain legal personhood under existing law.15 To 
me—and, I would wager, to most lawyers and laypeople alike—that is an ex-
traordinary claim. Historically, legal systems have only recognized (1) human 
beings and (2) entities endowed with “legal personhood”—that is, the ability to 
                                                        
12  See Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member 
LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2014) [hereinafter Bayern, Bitcoins]; Shawn Bayern, 
The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 94 (2015) [hereinafter Bayern, Entity Law]. 
13  Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 12, at 101. See also Bayern, Bitcoins, supra note 12, at 
1497. 
14  Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 12, at 102–03; Bayern, Bitcoins, supra note 12, at 1496–
97. “Legal sources” is a more accurate term than “statutes” because RULLCA is a model 
law, not an enacted statute. 
15  See Bayern, Bitcoins, supra note 12, at 1485. 
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sue, be sued, and take actions in the world that the legal system will enforce—
but that are ultimately and actively controlled by human beings.16 Bayern’s ar-
gument, if correct, would mean that legislatures have inadvertently created a 
new category of legal person—the first in history to be free of active human 
control. 
Such a claim should be supported by a thorough and meticulous legal anal-
ysis of whatever law(s) that supposedly make such artificial personhood possi-
ble using the standards by which a court of competent jurisdiction would assess 
the argument if presented with it. Unfortunately, Bayern’s articles—which 
seemingly have been accepted as reflecting legal reality by at least one promi-
nent legal commentator17—do not engage in such an analysis before boldly 
claiming that A.I. personhood is, for all intents and purposes, already here. 
A more rigorous statutory analysis reveals that it is unlikely that a court 
considering either New York’s statute or RULLCA would conclude that either 
statutory framework permits the continued existence of an LLC once it has zero 
members—and certainly if that memberless LLC is free of active human man-
agement and control. Bayern’s analysis zeroes in on the provisions in these 
statutes that set forth the circumstances under which an LLC must dissolve, en-
tirely ignoring numerous other provisions in both New York’s statute and 
RULLCA specifying how LLCs may or must conduct their affairs. Those pro-
visions reveal that an LLC ceases to be an LLC once it becomes memberless 
and reflect a clear legislative intent that humans would retain ultimate control 
over LLCs’ operations. 
A. New York 
The centerpiece of Bayern’s memberless LLC argument is that the dissolu-
tion provisions in New York’s LLC act permit an LLC to continue to exist even 
after all of its members withdraw. The provision that Bayern relies upon states 
that an LLC “is dissolved and its affairs shall be wound up” if: 
at any time there are no members, provided that, unless otherwise provided in 
the operating agreement, the limited liability company is not dissolved and is not 
required to be wound up if, within one hundred eighty days or such other period 
as is provided for in the operating agreement after the occurrence of the event 
                                                        
16  The only notable exception is that animals were occasionally charged with crimes in late 
medieval and early modern Europe. See generally E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS (1906). Of course, this exception was limited; be-
cause animals are, as far is anyone is aware, unable to enter contracts and own property, their 
participation in the legal system was strictly limited to the criminal and quasi-criminal 
sphere. See id. at 4 (noting that describing actions against animals as “civil” is a misnomer 
because they “were not suits to recover for damages to property, but had solely a preventive 
or prohibitive character.”). 
17  See Lynn M. Lopucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 890 (2018) (“In 
two recent articles, Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that anyone can confer legal per-
sonhood on an autonomous computer algorithm merely by putting it in control of a limited 
liability company.”). 
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that terminated the continued membership of the last remaining member, the le-
gal representative of the last remaining member agrees in writing to continue the 
limited liability company and to the admission of the legal representative of such 
member or its assignee to the limited liability company as a member, effective 
as of the occurrence of the event that terminated the continued membership of 
the last remaining member . . .18 
Bayern seizes upon the italicized statutory language—which is the only 
provision in the entire 115-section New York LLC statute that Bayern’s article 
cites—to argue that an LLC’s members could enter into an operating agreement 
setting a period of one million years before the legal representative of the last 
member must agree in writing to continue the LLC.19 During those million 
years, Bayern argues, the LLC could continue operating as an effective legal 
entity, with an A.I. system pulling all the levers pursuant to a carefully drafted 
operating agreement.20 
Bayern’s interpretation is plausible if one reads the text of § 701(a)(4) in 
isolation. But in New York, as in all jurisdictions, courts construe a statute as a 
whole, examining each section with reference to other sections, rather than ex-
amining only particular provisions.21 In New York, this principle is itself codi-
fied in a statute that provides: “Generally, it is immaterial in the construction of 
a statute that it is divided into sections, chapters, or titles, and all sections of a 
law must be read together to determine its fair meaning.”22 The overarching 
goal is to discern legislative intent, which requires examining the spirit and 
purpose of legislation as well as the text, context, and legislative history of the 
statute.23 
Here, based both on the language and structure of § 701(a)(4) itself and on 
the content of other provisions in the same statute, a New York court likely 
would reject Bayern’s assertion that it is possible to create an A.I.-controlled 
memberless LLC under New York Law. Various provisions in New York’s 
LLC act indicate that a member-managed LLC must have at least one member 
and thus ceases to exist once it loses its last member and/or demand that an 
LLC be managed by one or more members or managers.24 And under the stat-
ute, both managers and members must be “person[s].”25 
The better construction would be to interpret § 701(a)(4) not as containing 
a loophole allowing the indefinite existence of memberless LLCs, but rather as 
a “safe harbor” or “cure” provision. Specifically, it is best construed as apply-
ing to cases in which the sole member of a single-member LLC dies (or, in the 
                                                        
18  N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 701(a)(4) (McKinney 2018) (emphasis added). 
19  Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 12, at 103. 
20  Id. 
21  Albany Law Sch. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabili-
ties, 968 N.E.2d 967, 974 (N.Y. 2012). 
22  N.Y. STAT. LAW § 130 (McKinney 2018). 
23  Nostrom v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 940 N.E.2d 551, 554 (N.Y. 2010). 
24  See infra notes 25–36 and accompanying text. 
25  N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 102(p)–(q) (McKinney 2018). 
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case of a corporate member, dissolves), and makes no provision for the disposi-
tion of the member’s interest in the LLC. Section 701(a)(4)’s reference to the 
“legal representative” of a member (rather than to the member him-
self/herself/itself) is particularly significant in this regard because a preceding 
section of the LLC act (§ 608) covers situations where an LLC member dies or 
dissolves without making arrangements to transfer or otherwise dispose of the 
member’s LLC interest.26 By far the most plausible reading of § 701(a)(4) is as 
a safe harbor that provides the executor, heir, or successor of the last remaining 
member with an opportunity to “cure” the dissolution of the LLC by transfer-
ring the deceased or defunct member’s interest to a new member. 
1. LLC Members and Managers Must be Persons 
Section 102(m) of New York’s LLC law defines a “limited liability com-
pany” as “an unincorporated organization of one or more persons having lim-
ited liability for the contractual obligations and other liabilities of the business 
. . . .”27 The statute defines “person,” in turn, as a natural person, corporation, 
or other legal entity.28 LLCs must be managed either by its members or by 
member-appointed managers.29 Both members and managers must be “per-
son[s].”30 It does not take strong powers of deduction to conclude that these 
persons who are empowered to own and manage the LLC are the “persons” 
whose association defines an LLC.31 
The statute provides no escape route through which an LLC can legally op-
erate without any members or managers. Unless the articles of organization ex-
pressly provide for manager management, “management of the limited liability 
company shall be vested in its members who shall manage the limited liability 
company in accordance with this chapter . . .”32 And if the articles call for man-
ager management, then management “shall be vested in one or more managers” 
who “shall manage the limited liability company by the affirmative vote of a 
majority of the managers.”33 The managers or member-managers owe the LLC 
                                                        
26  Id. § 608. 
27  Id. § 102(m) (emphasis added). 
28  Id. § 102(w) (“ ‘Person’ means any association, corporation, joint stock company, estate, 
general partnership (including any registered limited liability partnership or foreign limited 
liability partnership), limited association, limited liability company (including a professional 
service limited liability company), foreign limited liability company (including a foreign 
professional service limited liability company), joint venture, limited partnership, natural 
person, real estate investment trust, business trust or other trust, custodian, nominee or any 
other individual or entity in its own or any representative capacity.”). 
29  Id. § 401(a). See also id. § 408. 
30  Id. § 102(p)–(q). 
31  See id. §§ 102(q)–(r) (defining “member” and “membership interest”); id. § 401 (requir-
ing LLCs to be managed by its members unless the LLC is manager-managed); id. § 408 
(describing powers and responsibilities of managers in manager-managed LLCs). 
32  Id. § 401(a) (emphasis added). 
33  Id. § 408(a)–(b) (emphasis added). 
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fiduciary duties of loyalty and care in exercising their management responsi-
bilities.34 Unlike many other provisions in the statute, those duties cannot be 
altered by the operating agreement.35 Likewise, there are no provisions permit-
ting operating agreements to modify the requirement that either managers or 
members actually manage the LLC.36  
For these reasons, during the million-year period of memberless operation 
suggested by Bayern’s hypothetical, any remnant of the LLC wouldn’t be a 
LLC. An erstwhile member-managed LLC that loses its last member no longer 
meets the definition of an LLC and could not satisfy the fundamental statutory 
requirements governing how LLCs must be managed. There might not yet be 
articles of dissolution or other documents showing that the LLC had dissolved 
but, nevertheless, a “zero-member LLC” would no longer be a legal entity in 
any practical sense. 
A.B. Medical Services., PLLC v. Travelers Indemnity Co.37 illustrates this 
point. The A.B. Med. Servs. case involved a Professional Limited Liability 
Company, which is, in essence, a regular LLC with the additional requirement 
that the LLC’s member(s) must be practicing physicians, attorneys, or other 
specified professionals.38 The LLC at issue in A.B. Med. Servs. was a medical 
practice that had one physician-member.39 That physician-member’s medical 
license was suspended, and losing his status as a practicing physician meant 
that he could no longer legally be a member of the LLC.40 The court explained 
the impact of this event: 
Once his medical license was suspended, he became legally disqualified from 
practicing medicine within the state and was disqualified from continuing as a 
member of plaintiff (see Limited Liability Company Law § 1209). Dissolution 
occurred on the effective date of the suspension of Dr. Braver’s medical license 
since, at that point, there were no remaining members of the professional ser-
vice limited liability company (see Limited Liability Company Law § 701[a][4] 
[a “limited liability company is dissolved and its affairs shall be wound up . . . at 
any time there are no members”]). We note that although articles of dissolution 
                                                        
34  See id. § 409; O’Connell v. Shallo (In re Die Fliedermaus LLC), 323 B.R. 101, 110 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing § 409). 
35  See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 409(a). 
36  In what was likely a legislative Freudian slip, § 409(a) states that each manager (including 
members acting as managers, see id. § 401(a)) “shall perform his or her duties . . . in good 
faith and with that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
use under similar circumstances.” Id. § 409(a) (emphasis added). The same section allows a 
manager to rely on information provided by certain other persons “[i]n performing his or her 
duties.” Id. (emphasis added). While the statutory definition of “manager” states that any 
“person” (a term that includes entities) may serve as manager, the use of gendered pronouns 
is a powerful—if not inescapable—signal that the legislature intended natural persons to ex-
ercise ultimate control over LLCs. 
37  A.B. Med. Servs., PLLC v. Travelers Indem. Co., 895 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. App. Term 
2009) [hereinafter A.B. Med. Servs. I]. 
38  Id.; see N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §§ 1201(b)–(d), 1203(a) (McKinney 2018). 
39  A.B. Med. Servs. I, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 760. 
40  Id. at 761; see N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 1209 (McKinney 2018). 
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have now been filed, there is no statutory requirement that articles of dissolu-
tion be filed before commencement of the winding up process.41 
The trial court in A.B. Medical Services had reached the same conclusion, 
stating that “[t]he entity since it is without members and since it has not taken 
steps to transfer ownership to a qualified member, must dissolve and wind up 
its affairs in accordance with Article VII of the Limited Liability Company 
Law.”42 In other words, because the LLC had no active members and had no 
active plan to bring in a new member, the LLC had dissolved. 
True, there is no indication that the operating agreement of the LLC in A.B. 
Med. Servs. had Bayern’s hypothetical “million-year” provision. But that is be-
side the point. The court’s reasoning suggests that the period after the disasso-
ciation of the last member is a period during which someone can cure the 
LLC’s dissolution by making arrangements to introduce a new member, not a 
period during which the memberless LLC can continue conducting business as 
usual without making any such arrangements. That conclusion is consistent 
with the grammatical structure of § 701(a)(4), under which the dissolution is 
effective as of the date the last member disassociates “unless” the necessary 
steps are taken to ensure the LLC’s continued existence.43 Thus, whether the 
period before the dissolution is finalized runs for a day, a month, or a million 
years is ultimately immaterial; unless arrangements to add a new member are in 
place, a New York court faced with a memberless LLC during that period 
would conclude that the LLC had already dissolved. 
2. The Limitations on Operating Agreements Under New York Law 
Bayern’s “memberless LLC” concept is also premised on his assertion that 
an operating agreement can be used to override any provision in an LLC stat-
ute.44 That logic fails to account for the fact that under the express terms of 
New York’s LLC law, operating agreements cannot be used to override provi-
sions in articles of organization or the LLC act itself.45 Unlike RULLCA, which 
treats most of its rules as mere default rules that can be dispensed with by a 
company’s operating agreement, New York’s statute expressly states that an 
                                                        
41  A.B. Med. Servs. I, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 761 (emphasis added). 
42  A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v. Travelers Indem. Co., 858 N.Y.S.2d 574, 578 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 
2008) [hereinafter A.B. Med. Servs. II] (emphasis added). The appellate court reversed the 
district court’s decision on other grounds, namely that the dissolution of the LLC did not 
warrant a stay in proceedings. See A.B. Med. Servs. I, N.Y.S.2d at 761. 
43  See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 701(a)(4) (McKinney 2018) (emphasis added); see also 
id. at § 211(d)(4) (requiring an LLC to file amended articles of organization within 90 days 
of an event that would trigger dissolution if the LLC wishes to continue its operations). 
44  See Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 12, at 104 (claiming that the range of action of an 
A.I.-controlled LLC extends to “anything a contract or operating agreement can specify as a 
term or condition.”). 
45  See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 202(j) (McKinney 2018). 
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LLC can “make and alter its operating agreement, not inconsistent with its arti-
cles of organization or with the laws of this state . . .”46 
Granted, many provisions describing the particulars of LLC management 
and membership include an explicit “except as provided in the operating 
agreement” caveat.47 But many key provisions—including the definitions of 
“LLC,” “manager,” “member,” and “person”48; the necessity of management 
by managers or members49; and the powers of a deceased member’s estate50—
contain no such carve-out. The LLC laws of New York are not, therefore, 
merely default rules that an LLC can override through an operating agreement. 
A clever LLC organizer cannot “contract around” the rules that preclude the 
existence of memberless LLCs. 
3. Purpose of the LLC Statute 
Bayern suggests that LLC statutes “emphasize[] the freedom of those in-
volved in the organization to determine its internal structure and . . . permit[] 
forms of governance much more flexible than those in traditional partnerships 
or corporations,” implying that states created the LLC precisely so that compa-
ny organizers could choose a form of organization that provides maximum 
flexibility.51 While this notion seems to have gained a certain quality of con-
ventional wisdom during the four decades since Wyoming adopted the first 
LLC statute, the conception of a LLC as a uniquely flexible “creature of con-
tract” is often overstated.52 Relevant here, New York courts have noted that 
“the purpose of the Limited Liability Company Law was to encourage business 
and commerce by allowing for formation of a new type of business entity—one 
that combined a corporation’s limitations on personal liability with the operat-
ing flexibility of a partnership . . . .”53 
                                                        
46  Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 417(a) (operating agreement can “contain[] any provi-
sions not inconsistent with law or its articles of organization relating to (i) the business of 
the limited liability company, (ii) the conduct of its affairs and (iii) the rights, powers, pref-
erences, limitations or responsibilities of its members, managers, employees or agents, as the 
case may be.”) (emphasis added). 
47  E.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 408(b) (McKinney 2018) (“Except as provided in the 
operating agreement and in accordance with section four hundred nineteen of this article, the 
managers shall manage the limited liability company by the affirmative vote of a majority of 
the managers.”). 
48  See supra Section II.A.1. 
49  See supra Section II.A.1. 
50  See infra Section II.A.4. 
51  Bayern, Entity Law, supra note 12, at 95. 
52  See generally Mohsen Manesh, Creatures of Contract: A Half-Truth About LLCs, 42 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 391 (2018). Indeed, courts in some states appear to reject the conception of LLCs 
as fundamentally “creatures of contract” altogether, instead describing them as “creature[s] 
of statute.” See Harbison v. Strickland, 900 So.2d 385, 389 (Ala. 2004); Patmon v. Hobbs, 
280 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009). 
53 Barklee Realty Co. v. Pataki, 765 N.Y.S.2d 599, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (emphasis 
added). See also Landa v. Herman, No. 105360/03, 2005 WL 2899876, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
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The legislative intent to provide LLCs with “flexibility” thus does not ex-
tend as far as Bayern suggests. Instead, LLCs are intended to have roughly the 
same flexibility in managing their internal affairs that a partnership would have. 
Partnerships cannot exist with zero partners.54 Like single-shareholder corpora-
tions, an LLC can exist with a single member,55 whereas a partnership requires 
an association of at least two persons as partners.56 But neither partnerships nor 
corporations can exist with zero partners or shareholders under New York law. 
4. Section 608 and the Real Meaning of § 701(a)(4) 
Section 701(a)(4) refers to the “legal representative of the last remaining 
member”57 rather than just to “the last remaining member.” The “legal repre-
sentative” of a member s is also referenced in § 608, which describes the rights 
and obligations of a “legal representative” of (1) a human LLC member who 
“dies or a court of competent jurisdiction adjudges him or her to be incompe-
tent”; and (2) an LLC member that is a non-human legal entity that “is dis-
solved or terminated.”58 In such a case, § 608 empowers the member’s execu-
tor, guardian, or other legal representative to exercise the member’s rights in 
the LLC.59 
A court would read § 701(a)(4) in light of § 608, which is part of the same 
statute, contains many of the same key terms, and covers a similar set of cir-
cumstances (i.e., what happens when an LLC loses a member). Section 608 
strongly suggests that § 701(a)(4) is a “safe harbor” for cases in which the sole 
remaining member of an LLC dies (or dissolves, in the case of a business enti-
ty) or becomes legally incapacitated without leaving clear instructions regard-
ing what should happen to the member’s interest in the LLC. This makes sense 
because it is only under those circumstances that the statute would need to con-
template action by the “legal representative” of the last remaining member ra-
ther than by the last remaining member himself, herself, or itself. 
                                                                                                                                
Oct. 27, 2005) (“An LLC combines the corporate limitation on personal liability of the own-
ers (who are called ‘members’) with the partnership’s operating and management flexibility 
by its members (which would be ‘member-managed’) or by persons selected by its members 
(which would be ‘manager-managed’)”) (internal quotation marks omitted). New York 
courts are hardly alone in analogizing LLCs to partnerships, albeit with corporation-like lim-
ited liability. In Delaware, the most influential state in terms of business organization law, 
courts have often looked to case law involving limited partnerships when analogous legal 
questions arise in the context of LLCs. See Manesh, supra note 52, at 425–26. 
54  N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 10 (McKinney 2018) (“A partnership is an association of two or more 
persons . . .”). 
55  N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 102(m) (McKinney 2018) (defining an LLC as “an unincor-
porated organization of one or more persons . . .”). 
56  N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 10 (McKinney 2018) (“A partnership is an association of two or more 
persons . . .”). 
57  N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 701(a)(4) (McKinney 2018). 
58  Id. § 608. 
59  Id. 
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The language of § 701(a)(4) thus, in reality, does no more than recognize 
that a member’s heir or successor may have an interest in continuing an LLC 
that otherwise would dissolve. There is no indication that the provision was 
meant to allow the last remaining member of an LLC to voluntarily resign 
while permitting the LLC itself to continue operating, and it is very unlikely 
that a court facing such a scenario would read the statute that way. 
5. Conclusion 
New York’s LLC law includes other provisions outside those listed above 
that would be impossible to fulfill or would make no sense if an LLC had no 
members. For instance, an LLC must maintain a current list of all members and 
managers.60 And the provisions relating to management of an LLC operate—
sometimes explicitly—on the presumption that the LLC has at least one mem-
ber.61 
It is difficult to conceive how an LLC could comply with the numerous re-
quirements set forth in New York’s LLC law without any active members, 
which suggests that the legislature did not intend to allow memberless LLCs to 
exist. Bayern, focusing on only § 701(a)(4), interprets the statute differently. In 
cases where a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, 
the court will choose the construction that harmonizes any seemingly conflict-
ing provisions in light of the apparent legislative intent behind the statute as a 
whole.62 In so doing, New York courts, like all courts: 
• avoid constructions that lead to absurd results;63 
• avoid constructions that are unreasonable or would undercut the purpose 
behind a statutory provision;64 and 
• recognize that legislatures expect courts to use common sense when inter-
preting a statute.65 
                                                        
60  Id. § 1102(a)(1)–(2). 
61  E.g., id. §§ 401(a) (LLC presumed to be managed by all members unless the LLC’s arti-
cles of organization or operating agreement contains provisions “granting or withholding the 
management powers or responsibilities of one or more members or classes of members”) 
(emphasis added), 402(c) (requiring majority votes of members for certain legally significant 
acts, regardless of whether LLC is member- or manager-managed). 
62  E.g., Ador Realty, LLC v. Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 802 N.Y.S.2d 190, 196 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005) (“The rules of statutory construction . . . require that, where it is possible to 
do so, the various parts of the statutory scheme be harmonized, reading and construing them 
together and reconciling the apparently conflicting provisions in the manner most consistent 
with the overall legislative intent.”) (citations omitted). 
63  In re Fay, 52 N.E.2d 97, 103 (N.Y. 1943) (“In the construction of a statutory or constitu-
tional provision a meaning should not be given to words that are the subject of construction 
that will defeat the purpose and intent of the statutory provision or that will make such provi-
sion absurd.”). 
64  Id.; City of Buffalo v. Maggio, 275 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) (“[A]n un-
reasonable construction, contrary to the general statutory policies and standards of the state, 
should not be adopted in the absence of a definite intent, clearly and unmistakably ex-
pressed.”). 
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Here, a construction of § 701(a)(4) that would permit an LLC to set a mil-
lion-year safe harbor period would plainly undercut the purpose of the provi-
sion, which is to ensure that LLCs dissolve if they become memberless. It also 
would, frankly, be an unreasonable and absurd result given the numerous pro-
visions in the statute whose practical vitality depends on the LLC having at 
least one member. Courts tend to avoid such constructions even if they are con-
sistent with a statute’s plain language.66 Here, because Bayern’s interpretation 
of § 701(a)(4) would be patently inconsistent with the plain language of many 
provisions in New York’s LLC law, there is little to commend a hyper-
technical and contextually divorced reading of § 701(a)(4) that interprets it as 
permitting the continued existence of an LLC that loses its last member. 
Reading § 701(a)(4) in isolation, Bayern’s interpretation of New York law 
makes some sense. But viewed in the broader context of the statute as a whole, 
which is how courts construe statutes, it is plain that a memberless LLC inhab-
ited by an A.I. system could not exist as an effective legal entity for a million 
years—or even one day—under New York law. 
B. The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA) 
RULLCA does not rescue Bayern’s argument that a memberless, A.I.-
directed LLC could have legal vitality. At the outset, it is important to remem-
ber that “uniform laws” like RULLCA are not actually laws. Rather, they are 
blueprints for laws prepared by legal scholars and practitioners. States can 
adopt, adapt, or ignore uniform laws. In the case of RULLCA, the majority of 
states have gone with the “ignore” option. 
The Uniform Law Commission’s (ULC’s) website includes a map showing 
eighteen states that, according to the ULC, have adopted RULLCA.67 Bayern’s 
articles imply that these RULLCA-adopting states did so without making any 
substantial changes.68 That is not correct. An examination of actual enacted 
statutes from the states that have “adopted” RULLCA reveals that each state 
                                                                                                                                
65  Chatsworth 72nd St. Corp. v. Rigai, 336 N.Y.S.2d 604, 612 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (“[T]he 
ordinary rules of common sense . . . are integrated into every issue of statutory construc-
tion.”). See also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014) (“Part of a fair reading of 
statutory text is recognizing that ‘Congress legislates against the backdrop’ of certain unex-
pressed presumptions . . . . The notion that some things ‘go without saying’ applies to legis-
lation just as it does to everyday life.”). 
66  E.g., United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A statute should not be 
literally applied if it results in an interpretation clearly at odds with the intent of the drafters. 
While the Court cannot and should not rewrite a poorly drafted statute, it has an obligation to 
interpret a statute so as to give it reasonable meaning.”). 
67  The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Acts: Limited Liability Company 
(2006) (last amended 2013), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.a 
spx?title=Limited%20Liability%20Company%20(2006)%20(Last%20Amended%202013) 
[https://perma.cc/BD56-4N9V] (last visited Sept. 17, 2018). 
68  See Bayern, Bitcoins, supra note 12, at 1497 n.40 (citing to the Uniform Law Commis-
sion’s webpage for RULLCA). 
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made modifications—and some made significant modifications—to at least 
some substantive provisions from the model law.69 
But even if one were to treat RULLCA as if it is, in fact, an actual statute, 
and examine its text in the manner of a typical American court engaging in 
statutory construction, it still is unlikely that a court would construe RULLCA 
as permitting the creation of a memberless LLC run by an unsupervised A.I. An 
examination of state statutes based on RULLCA only reinforces that conclu-
sion. 
1. The Text of RULLCA 
Like New York, RULLCA allows only “members” and “managers” to 
manage an LLC,70 and both members and managers must, by express defini-
tion, be “persons.”71 A member-managed LLC without any members thus 
would be unable to operate in compliance with RULLCA. 
Under the express terms of RULLCA, the longest an LLC can arguably 
survive with zero members is 90 days: 
(a) A limited liability company is dissolved, and its activities and affairs must be 
wound up, upon . . . 
(3) the passage of 90 consecutive days during which the company has no mem-
bers unless before the end of the period: 
(A) consent to admit at least one specified person as a member is given by trans-
ferees owning the rights to receive a majority of distributions as transferees at 
the time the consent is to be effective; and 
(B) at least one person becomes a member in accordance with the consent[.]72 
Bayern attempts to dismiss the significance of this limitation by suggesting 
that a state could adopt RULLCA without it.73 But his articles fail to identify a 
single state that actually has done so. 
In any event, even construing § 701(a)(3) as permitting a 90-day period of 
memberless active existence hinges on courts adopting a maximalist reading of 
that provision. As indicated by the A.B. Medical Services74 case construing the 
similarly worded New York provision, a court faced with construing 
§ 701(a)(3) likely would hold that the dissolution occurred at the time that the 
                                                        
69  See infra Section II.B.2. 
70  UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 102(12) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006) (amended 2013) (defin-
ing a “member-managed” LLC as an LLC that “is not . . . manager-managed”). Unless oth-
erwise stated, all citations to RULLCA are to the version of RULLCA as it appeared after 
the most recent series of amendments in 2013. Document available at http://www.uniformla 
ws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/ULLCA_Final_2014_2015aug19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2JQW-TQKS] (last visited Sept. 24, 2018). 
71  Id. § 102(9), (11). 
72  Id. § 701. 
73  Bayern, Bitcoins, supra note 12, at 1496–97. 
74  A.B. Med. Servs. PLLC v. Travelers Indem. Co., 858 N.Y.S.2d 574, 578 (N.Y.S.2d 2008) 
(“A.B. Med. Servs. I”). 
19 NEV. L.J. 259, SCHERER  1/28/2019  11:58 AM 
Fall 2018] WILD BEASTS AND DIGITAL ANALOGUES 275 
 
last member withdrew.75 As with New York’s provision, the 90-day window is 
best viewed as a period for cure rather than a period of active existence. Indeed, 
that is how the 1996 version of RULLCA structured the predecessor to the cur-
rent 90-day automatic dissolution rule.76 
This construction is consistent with the structure of both § 701(a)(3) itself 
and with § 401(c)(4), which permits a person to be appointed as a member “as 
provided in Section 701(a)(3).”77 A “cure period” interpretation of the 90-day 
window is further reinforced by §§ 702(c)–(d), which, like § 608 of New 
York’s statute, permits the “legal representative of the last person to have been 
a member” to wind up the LLC’s affairs.78 
One could argue that the 90-day provision is merely a default rule that is 
subject to modification by an LLC’s operating agreement. Indeed, the ULC’s 
comments on § 701 in the “harmonized” version of RULLCA state that 
§ 701(a)(3), unlike the two subparagraphs that follow it, is a default rule.79 But 
it does not follow from this that the organizers of a LLC can contract their way 
around the requirement that the entity be managed by a person—that is, a man-
ager or member. 
Moreover, it is not necessarily apropos of anything that the drafters of 
RULLCA neglected to include an explicit provision stating that a LLC must 
have at least one member. Even under RULLCA’s admittedly hyper-flexible 
framework for LLCs, numerous provisions clearly state or presume that an 
LLC will have at least one member and be run by members or managers. Sec-
tion 102(13), for instance, defines an operating agreement, in part, as “the 
agreement . . . of all the members of a limited liability company, including a 
sole member.”80 Section 105(a)(1) similarly states that an operating agreement 
governs “relations among the members as members and between the members 
                                                        
75  See supra Section II.A.1. 
76  See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(3) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1996) [hereinafter “ULLCA”] (requiring dissolution upon the occurrence of “an event that 
makes it unlawful for all or substantially all of the business of the company to be continued, 
but any cure of illegality within 90 days after notice to the company of the event is effective 
retroactively to the date of the event for purposes of this section”). Because the preface to 
RULLCA did not list the dissolution provisions in its description of the noteworthy changes 
RULLCA made to ULLCA, there is no reason to believe that the modifications to § 701 
were intended to alter the “period for cure” nature of this provision. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. 
ACT, Prefatory Note (UNIF LAW COMM’N 2006) (amended 2013). 
77 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 401(c)(4) (UNIF LAW COMM’N 2006) (amended 2013). The 
version of § 401(d)(4) that appeared in the 2006 version of RULLCA restated the rule from 
§ 701(a)(3) explicitly, providing that the legal representative of the last surviving member 
could appoint a new member, but only if the designee consents to become a member “within 
90 consecutive days after the company ceases to have any members.” UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. 
ACT § 401(d)(4), 7 U.L.A. (2006). 
78  UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 702(c)–(d) (UNIF LAW COMM’N 2006) (amended 2013); N.Y. 
LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 608 (McKinney 2018). 
79  UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701 comments (UNIF LAW COMM’N 2006) (amended 2013). 
80  Id. § 102. 
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and the limited liability company.”81 Section 108(a) specifies that “[a] limited 
liability company is an entity distinct from its member or members.”82 And so 
on. 
Courts recognize that “some things ‘go without saying’ ” in legislation just 
as in everyday life, and legislatures thus always legislate “ ‘against the back-
drop’ of certain unexpressed presumptions.”83 The idea that an LLC must have 
at least one member is precisely such an unexpressed presumption. The princi-
ple that an artificial legal entity must have at least one owner, shareholder, or 
member is sufficiently engrained, both in the text of RULLCA and in the legal 
milieu more generally, that there is no real need to spell it out. 
More broadly, it is not surprising that legislatures did not include provi-
sions in their statutes explicitly requiring that a business organization be, at its 
base, under the control of humans (or of an entity controlled by humans, or an 
entity controlled by an entity controlled by humans). Even today, with all the 
advances in machine learning that have taken place in the past decade, the con-
cept of a sophisticated AI system capable of carrying out the multifaceted tasks 
necessary to manage a business organization without direct and continuous 
human supervision lies more than in the realm of theory than imminent techno-
logical reality. Certainly, twentieth-century legislatures had no reason to antici-
pate and thus no need to legislate for a world in which an ostensible LLC could 
engage in substantial activity without human supervision. 
For these reasons, there was never any pressing need to have a specific 
provision explicitly declaring that an LLC must have at least one member, or 
that an LLC therefore must dissolve once it has no remaining members. It is 
highly unlikely that a court would conclude that a statute tracking RULLCA 
permits the existence of an LLC with zero members under the control of an A.I. 
system. 
2. Enacted Statutes Based on RULLCA 
As previously noted, RULLCA is not a law in and of itself. It is instead a 
“model law” that states can adopt or adapt. According to the Uniform Law 
Commission, eighteen states plus the District of Columbia have adopted 
RULLCA in some form as of 2018.84 The author examined the statutes in seven 
                                                        
81  Id. § 105(a)(1). 
82  Id. § 108(a). 
83  Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014). A similar principle has been expressed 
by courts construing contracts. See, e.g., Dieckman v. Regency GP LP, 155 A.3d 358, 368 
(Del. 2017) (holding that the absence of express contractual terms “are easily implied be-
cause ‘the parties must have intended them and have only failed to express them because 
they are too obvious to need expression.’ Stated another way, ‘some aspects of the deal are 
so obvious to the participants that they never think, or see no need, to address them.’ ”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
84  The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Limited Liability Company 
(2006) Last Amended 2013), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.a 
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of those states: the five largest RULLCA states (California, Florida, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington) plus South Dakota and Wyoming, which punch 
above their proverbial weight as forums for the formation of companies due to 
their favorable taxation and corporate secrecy laws.85 
Each of those seven states has the three features listed in the above analysis 
of RULLCA that make it unlikely that a court would recognize a “memberless 
LLC” as a legal entity. That is: 
• Each state requires an LLC to be member- or manager-managed, and re-
quires both “members” and “managers” to be persons;86 and 
• Each state has a provision that an LLC automatically dissolves 90 days 
(180 days in Pennsylvania) after the death or departure of its last mem-
ber.87 
Various other provisions in adopting states’ statutes necessarily assume or 
imply that an LLC must have at least one member. Indeed, most of the 
RULLCA states have additional provisions above and beyond those appearing 
in RULLCA that preclude the possibility of memberless LLCs.88 
C. Conclusion 
One may reasonably question why Bayern’s articles and the ideas espoused 
therein merit seven thousand words of refutation. The answer is twofold. First, 
many people read law review articles as a source of legal information, particu-
larly in emerging and uncertain areas of law. If the information in a law review 
article is inaccurate or incomplete, a reader will end up with a skewed idea of 
what the law is. That danger is particularly acute if the reader is someone with-
out legal training. Here, there is scant case law discussing the possibility of a 
zero-member LLC, and no case law discussing A.I. personhood. Consequently, 
if a person wishes to know whether it is possible to create an autonomous A.I. 
                                                                                                                                
spx?title=Limited%20Liability%20Company%20(2006)%20(Last%20Amended%202013) 
[https://perma.cc/BD56-4N9V] (last visited Sept. 17, 2018). 
85  See, e.g., J. Weston Phippen, Nevada, a Tax Haven for Only $174, ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/04/panama-papers-nevada/476994 
/ [https://perma.cc/5VWR-B7SC] (listing South Dakota and Wyoming along with Delaware 
and Nevada as popular states for incorporation due to tax benefits and a high level of permit-
ted corporate secrecy). 
86  FLA. STAT. § 605.0102(38)–(41) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 25.15.006(8)–(11), 
25.15.151(1)(a), 25.15.154(1)(a) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-102(a)(x)–(xiii), 17-29-
407(a)(i)(A)–(C), (c)(i) (2018). 
87  Illinois and South Dakota are still operating under variations of the 1996 version of 
RULLCA, under which an LLC automatically dissolves upon the occurrence of any event 
that makes it impossible for the LLC to be operated lawfully—which would include having 
no members or managers, since such an LLC could not be managed in accordance with the 
law—unless the illegality is cured within 90 days. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801 
(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1996). 
88  Matt Scherer, Is AI Personhood Already Possible Under U.S. LLC Laws? (Part Three), 
LAW & AI (June 18, 2017), http://www.lawandai.com/2017/06/18/is-ai-personhood-already-
possible-under-u-s-llc-laws-part-three/ [https://perma.cc/6HWR-TKUA]. 
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system and have the law treat it like a person, Bayern’s articles and those citing 
it would very likely be among the first things they would come across. 
That leads to the second, deeper reason that Bayern’s proposal matters: if 
some misguided entrepreneur actually attempted to put Bayern’s framework 
into practice, they would actually be creating a situation where, regardless of 
whether Bayern is correct or incorrect, victims likely would be unable to obtain 
compensation if the ostensible “memberless LLC” causes harm. 
Part I’s discussion on the definition of legal personhood explains why a 
dissolved entity loses the capacity to sue. That may seem to be a good thing if a 
court were faced with a “memberless LLC,” since that lack of capacity would 
limit the erstwhile LLC’s ability to take legally meaningful actions. But there is 
a dark flip side to a dissolved entity’s inability to sue to enforce its rights—
namely, that others cannot sue that entity to enforce their rights. Ordinarily, 
when someone is injured or their rights are violated, that person can sue who-
ever caused the injury and seek compensation or some other form of redress. 
This option is not available if the injury was caused by something that is not a 
legal person and therefore lacks the capacity to be sued. The well-known legal 
maxim “for every wrong, the law provides a remedy” does not hold true for 
harms caused by non-persons. 
This means that a “memberless LLC” could be effectively immune from 
suit for events that occurred after the withdrawal of the last member. Injuries 
caused by the system would be like injuries caused by a wild animal. Because 
animals are not legal persons, victims of animal attacks have no legal remedy 
unless they can identify a legal person who can be held legally responsible for 
the animal’s conduct. With respect to wild animals, who are not owned or pos-
sessed by any person or entity, the lack of animal personhood means that no 
one can be held legally responsible for harms they cause. 
With that in mind, let us imagine for a moment what might happen if a per-
son decided, whether for business reasons or out of curiosity, to create an A.I. 
system that has personhood. Following Bayern’s framework, the person sets up 
a single-member LLC under member management, creates an operating agree-
ment placing the LLC under the control of an A.I. system, withdraws as a 
member, and assumes that they have created a legal person. Relying on Bay-
ern’s reasoning, the organizer of the A.I.-controlled LLC would believe that the 
LLC is a real legal entity and that, as a result, the organizer is not legally re-
sponsible for the A.I. system’s operations through the LLC. 
Regardless of whether Bayern’s analysis is right or wrong, the resulting 
situation would be troubling. If Bayern’s analysis is correct and the memberless 
LLC remained a legal person, then we would have a completely unaccountable 
A.I. system with all the rights of legal persons and, because the LLC is mem-
berless, no human who could be held responsible for harm to persons or proper-
ty that the A.I. system causes. 
That certainly is troubling enough. But at least if Bayern is right, the LLC 
itself could be held liable for any harms that the A.I. system causes. If, as this 
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article argues, Bayern’s analysis is not correct, the result could be even worse. 
The original organizer of the LLC, having bought into Bayern’s proposal, pre-
sumably would not attempt to supervise the A.I. system’s operations. If the A.I. 
system causes injury, a court would have two choices: (1) use its equitable 
powers to hold the now-departed organizer responsible; or (2) hold no one re-
sponsible. Option (1) would obviously be the opposite of what the organizer 
intended, and the organizer may not have the resources to compensate the in-
jured party anyway. Option (2) would mean that, in effect, the organizer had 
created a wild animal. We would still have a completely unaccountable A.I. 
system, but this time without any possibility of victims seeking redress from 
the LLC that the A.I. system controls. 
As noted above, courts use common sense and examine the spirit and pur-
pose of a statute when determining what a statute means. For these reasons, 
there is little reason to fear that a court would recognize a memberless LLC as a 
legal person. But courts generally do not get involved until after something has 
gone wrong. Given the speed with which digital systems can operate—and the 
equally impressive velocity of technology progress in the field of A.I.—courts 
cannot be relied upon to act as an effective check on an otherwise unaccounta-
ble A.I. system.89 For this reason, legally questionable blueprints for A.I. per-
sonhood must be challenged, lest an unwary reader—whether intentionally or 
inadvertently—create the digital equivalent of a wild beast. 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO A.I. PERSONHOOD: DIGITAL ANALOGUES 
The questions posed in the preceding two sections were (1) whether A.I. 
systems should be persons and (2) whether they already could be. Having an-
swered these first two questions in the negative, this question remains: If A.I. 
systems are not persons, then what are they? Or, to be more precise, how 
should the law treat them? Pinning down a firm answer to this question is es-
sential for both the developers of A.I. systems and for society at large: 
Clarifying the legal status of A/IS . . . is essential in removing the uncertainty 
associated with the obligations and expectations for organization and operation 
of these systems. Clarification along these lines will encourage more certain de-
velopment and deployment of A/IS and will help clarify lines of legal responsi-
bility and liability when A/IS cause harm.90 
Typically, when common law courts are faced with novel legal situations, 
they search for analogous components of existing areas of law. If personhood is 
taken off the table, what would be the appropriate legal analogue for an auton-
omous digital system capable—unlike any prior human invention—of taking 
                                                        
89  See Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 368, 389–90 (2016) (discussing 
the likely need for ex ante action given the potential scale of risks associated with A.I., and 
discussing the shortcomings of the ex post common law tort system as a mechanism for 
managing the risks associated with A.I.). 
90  INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, supra note 11, at 148. 
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legally meaningful actions without specific human input? This final section 
discusses three possible digital analogues: products, animals, and agents. It ul-
timately concludes that the lattermost option provides the best mix of meaning-
ful rules for the present and flexibility for the future. 
A. Products 
From my admittedly anecdotal discussions with other lawyers, the most 
commonly held view is that the traditional rules of products liability will apply 
to A.I. systems that cause harm. Those liability rules (at least in the United 
States) are in some ways reminiscent of the unlimited liability rules that tradi-
tionally applied to the owners of companies that are not themselves legal enti-
ties. In most instances, a company is strictly liable for any harm caused by a 
defective product that it designed, manufactured, or sold even if the company 
itself was in no way negligent. The most familiar form of this principle comes 
from the venerable Restatement (Second) of Torts, which makes clear that the 
manufacturer or seller of a defective product is liable for harm even if it “exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product”: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller.91 
This rule arose in an age of assembly lines and centralized manufacturing, 
and still makes a great deal of sense for items produced through traditional in-
dustrial processes. But given the manner in which digital technologies—
including but certainly not limited to A.I.—are often developed,92 imposition of 
strict liability could lead to outcomes that seem less than just. Specifically, a 
strict liability regime for A.I. could result in liability being assigned to parties 
that had only a highly attenuated influence on the finished system and could not 
have reasonably foreseen or prevented the harm. 
As with all digital technologies, the programmers of A.I. systems generally 
make extensive use of open-source or “commercial off-the-shelf (‘COTS’)” 
software components rather than being programmed from the ground up:93 
The sheer number of individuals and firms that may participate in the design, 
modification, and incorporation of an AI system’s components will make it dif-
                                                        
91  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)–(2) cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
92  Scherer, supra note 89, at 369–73. 
93  See id. at 370–71. 
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ficult to identify the most responsible party or parties. Some components may 
have been designed years before the AI project had even been conceived, and 
the components’ designers may never have envisioned, much less intended, that 
their designs would be incorporated into any AI system, still less the specific AI 
system that caused harm. In such circumstances, it may seem unfair to assign 
blame to the designer of a component whose work was far-removed in both time 
and geographic location from the completion and operation of the AI system.94 
In addition, the increasing use and sophistication of machine learning dis-
tinguishes A.I. not only from pre-digital technologies, but also from other digi-
tal technologies. Machine learning enables an A.I. system to grow and change 
when exposed to new data, thus giving them the ability to learn “without being 
explicitly programmed” by humans.95 This means that the manner in which an 
A.I. system operates may change—and perhaps change quite radically—
depending on what it “learn[s]” during the course of its operations.96 “[E]ven 
the most careful designers, programmers, and manufacturers will not be able to 
control or predict what an AI system will experience after it leaves their 
care.”97 As a result, it may sit uneasily with our collective sense of justice to 
subject the developer of a learning A.I. system to the same strict liability as the 
manufacturer of a defective airbag. 
Imposing the rules of products liability on A.I. would discourage innova-
tion and creative applications of new A.I. technologies. The designers of learn-
ing A.I. systems, knowing that they face strict liability, would have a powerful 
incentive “to limit the ability of consumers and users to modify, adapt or cus-
tomize their advanced AI and robotics products in order to retain greater con-
trol over how they are used.”98 This would greatly reduce the potential for ben-
eficial A.I. systems to have a positive impact on society.99 A.I. thus seems to 
demand an approach that better accounts for the unique development trajectory 
of digital technologies and the unique autonomous potential of learning A.I. 
systems. 
B. Animals 
Animals may appear to be a more nuanced analogue for the legal treatment 
of A.I.-caused harm. Animals have a level of autonomy that consumer products 
                                                        
94  Id. at 372. 
95  Margaret Rouse, What Is Machine Learning, WHATIS.COM, http://searchenterpriseai.techt 
arget.com/definition/machine-learning-ML [https://perma.cc/C5VY-YLPZ] (last updated 
May 2018). 
96  See id. 
97  Scherer, supra note 89, at 366. 
98  Peter M. Asaro, The Liability Problem for Autonomous Artificial Agents, ASSOC. 
ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 190, 193 (2016) (“[W]e could pursue one of the 
heavy-handed liability schemes, such as strict liability, that would regulate the industry to 
some extent, but also limit innovation to those areas where there are sufficient profits to mo-
tivate large capital companies to enter the market and accept the risks.”). 
99  See id. 
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lack, but they still are not governed by a conscience “and possess great capacity 
to do mischief if not restrained.”100 Consequently, legal systems invariably im-
pose legal obligations on owners and keepers of animals to ensure that those 
animals do not cause harm to others. Similar impulses may well guide the legal 
treatment of A.I. systems. 
In common law jurisdictions, the extent of an animal keeper’s duty tradi-
tionally depends on whether the animal is a “wild” animal or a “domestic” an-
imal.101 For a wild animal that is considered dangerous by nature and kept as a 
pet, the animal’s owner or keeper is strictly liable for any injury or property 
damage that the animal causes.102 If a farmer has a pet wolf that kills two of his 
neighbor’s chickens, the farmer is legally responsible for compensating the 
neighbor for the lost chickens—even if the wolf had always been perfectly 
tame previously. The theory behind imposing such strict liability is that wild 
animals are inherently dangerous, such that a wild animal’s keeper is effective-
ly on notice from day one that the animal presents a risk to others.103 
For domesticated animals kept as pets, however, the owner generally must 
have some knowledge of that specific animal’s dangerous propensity and there-
after failed to take adequate precautions.104 In other words, if the farmer owned 
a golden retriever instead of a wolf in the previous example, the neighbor 
would have no remedy unless he could show that the dog had eaten a neigh-
bor’s chicken or otherwise shown “dangerous propensities” at least once be-
fore. This rule gave rise to one of the more amusing legal expressions: every 
dog gets “one free bite.”105 
                                                        
100  EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 41 (4th ed. 2005). 
101  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 506 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (defining “wild” and 
“domestic” animals). 
102  See id. § 507 (imposing strict liability where the wild animal has “a dangerous propensity 
that is characteristic of wild animals of the particular class, or of which the possessor knows 
or has reason to know.”). 
103  See id. cmt. c: 
One who keeps a wild animal is required to know the dangerous propensities normal to the class 
to which it belongs. It is therefore not necessary in order for the rule stated in this Section to be 
applicable that its possessor should have reason to know that the particular animal possesses a 
dangerous propensity. He may reasonably believe that it has been so tamed as to have lost all of 
these propensities; nonetheless he takes the risk that at any moment the animal may revert to and 
exhibit them. 
104  Compare id. § 509 (imposing strict liability on keepers of domestic animals known to 
have “dangerous propensities abnormal to its class”), with id. § 518 (imposing only fault-
based liability on keepers of domestic animals with no known dangerous propensities). 
105  See 3B C.J.S. Animals § 369 (2018). That expression is not quite true in a literal sense, 
however; even if a dog has not actually bitten someone before, the owner might face liability 
if the dog had previously shown aggressive or dangerous behavior. See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 cmt. c (noting that the rule of strict liability for animals with 
known dangerous propensities applies even “if the animal is not vicious” if it nevertheless 
“has a dangerous tendency that is unusual and not necessary for the purposes for which such 
animals are usually kept”). 
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What lessons might animal liability law offer for A.I.? If we believe that 
A.I. systems are inherently risky (or if we just want to be extra cautious), we 
could treat all A.I. systems like wild animals and hold their owners strictly lia-
ble for harms that they cause. But such a blanket rule would seem unfair if ap-
plied to A.I. systems whose functions are so narrow that they do not present 
much of a risk to anyone. It would seem somewhat silly to treat AlphaGo, a 
system designed to play a board game, as if it is just as dangerous as an auton-
omous weapon system.106 
A better approach might be to treat different classes of A.I. systems as akin 
to different species of animals. The classification of system as “wild” or “do-
mesticated” could be based on the intended function of the system—perhaps an 
autonomous security system is inherently dangerous, but a computerized tennis 
coach is not. Or it could be based on the operational history of A.I. systems 
with similar software and hardware—if a particular type of A.I. system has a 
proven track record of safe operation, it could be declared “domesticated” and 
their developers, distributors, and operators would enjoy relaxed standards of 
liability. 
One obvious difference between animals and A.I. systems is that animals 
do not have human designers and manufacturers, and typically there are no 
more than one or two persons that are legally responsible for an animal at a 
given time. Thus, the principles of animal law run up against many of the same 
barriers as products liability in terms of their fitness as legal analogues for 
A.I.—they do not account for the fact that there may be many parties involved 
in the design and development of A.I. systems that cause harm, thus complicat-
ing the assignment and apportionment of liability. 
C. Children 
For those seeking a more anthropomorphic approach to A.I.’s legal status, 
children could serve as an interesting model. Children have very limited legal 
rights, but the limits on their legal rights are paired with limits on their legal re-
sponsibilities. Instead, for children, many of the legal rights and responsibilities 
of citizenship are instead held or exercised by their parents or guardians. 
At the beginning of their lives, children have some passive rights under the 
law, such as the right to be free from abuse and the right to receive an educa-
tion. They are not, however, “persons” in the legal sense. Children cannot vote, 
serve on a jury, or travel freely. Most important for purposes of this discussion, 
they cannot sue to vindicate their already-limited legal rights except through a 
parent or legal guardian. And even where children can be sued nominally, they 
                                                        
106  Then again, even A.I. systems with a seemingly innocuous purpose could pose a risk to 
others if humans do not take appropriate safety precautions. As stated in the most widely 
used introductory textbook on A.I., “even if you only want your program to play chess or 
prove theorems, if you give it the capability to learn and alter itself, you need safeguards.” 
STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 1039 
(3d ed. 2010). 
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generally lack independent financial resources sufficient to satisfy a judgment 
against them. The rights and responsibilities associated with a child’s life and 
behavior generally lie with the parents rather than the child during the period of 
minority. 
The Supreme Court’s 1979 opinion in Parham v. J.R.107 represents perhaps 
the starkest example of children’s limited legal status under American law. The 
Parham case involved children whose parents committed them to state-run 
mental hospitals—a commitment processed deemed “voluntary” under state 
law because the children’s parents (though not the children themselves) had re-
quested the commitment.108 The Supreme Court rejected the children’s argu-
ment that being committed against their will without a pre-commitment fact-
finding hearing violated their due process rights. The court reasoned: 
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of 
the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases 
have consistently followed that course; our constitutional system long ago re-
jected any notion that a child is “the mere creature of the State” and, on the con-
trary, asserted that parents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty, 
to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.”109 
Parents’ rights of control over their children are accompanied by legal re-
sponsibility for their children’s behavior; in most American states, parents can 
be held civilly liable for wrongful and injurious acts of their children.110 But as 
the Parham Court’s reasoning implies, a child gradually gains legal autonomy 
and the parents’ legal right and responsibility to control their children dimin-
ishes as the child matures. Once a child reaches adulthood, parents bear no lia-
bility whatsoever for even the most heinous acts. 
A similar paradigm could be imagined as a legal analogue for A.I. systems. 
During the early years after its initial deployment, liability for harms caused by 
an A.I. system could rest with the designer(s) of the system and the persons re-
sponsible for deploying it, thus providing those persons with a strong incentive 
to supervise and control the system’s operations. As the system develops a rec-
ord of safe operation over the period of several years, the system could be al-
lowed to gain additional autonomy, and the balance of legal responsibility 
could gradually transfer from the persons responsible for the system’s design 
                                                        
107  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
108  Id. at 589–91. 
109  Id. at 602 (alteration in original) (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 
(1925)). 
110  Several states hold parents strictly liable for intentional or reckless harm caused by their 
children. E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-112(1) (McKinney 2018) (“The parent or legal 
guardian . . . of an infant over ten and less than eighteen years of age, shall be liable . . . for 
damages caused by such infant, where such infant has willfully, maliciously, or unlawfully 
damaged, defaced or destroyed such public or private property . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 30.765(1) (2018) (“In addition to any other remedy provided by law, the parent or parents 
of an unemancipated minor child shall be liable for actual damages to person or property 
caused by any tort intentionally or recklessly committed by such child.”). 
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and deployment to the system itself. The presumption under such a regime 
would be that all A.I. systems would eventually achieve full legal autonomy 
and personality, absent exceptional circumstances, and that the original design-
ers and operators of the system would eventually be absolved of legal responsi-
bility for the conduct of their mechanical progeny. 
But the fact would remain that the end result of such a legal framework 
would be legal personhood for A.I. systems. For the reasons explained 
above,111 that would be unwise given the current state of both the technology 
and society. In addition, such a framework would mean that the designers and 
operators of such a system would eventually, like the parents of children, be 
free from liability for the system’s actions. Applying such a rule would ignore 
the fact that the designers and operators of an A.I. system play a more direct 
role in shaping an A.I. system than parents of children. As influential as parents 
are on a child’s physical and mental development, they do not design a child’s 
physical components or directly program a child’s intellect or manner of inter-
action with the world. 
D. Agents 
In the future, A.I. systems will work with humans in many fields perform-
ing complex tasks, in much the same manner as human workers work alongside 
one another in the workplace.112 The trend has, in fact, already begun; algo-
rithms now perform many functions once performed by human workers, in-
cluding “scheduling humans’ meetings online, handling travel request forms[,] 
processing employment contracts . . . . [and] helping manage warehouses and 
parking garages to boost efficiency.”113 Physical workplaces are likewise see-
ing an increased degree of human-robot interaction with the rise of collabora-
tive robots, or “cobots,” which have “smaller physical footprint, lighter physi-
cal touch, and nimbler abilities” than earlier generations of robots, and thus are 
“easier to integrate among employees and existing machines.”114 In many ways, 
companies have already begun using and thinking about A.I. systems in much 
the same way as human workers—as agents to whom they delegate tasks nec-
essary to carry on the company’s business. 
This points to what is perhaps the most appealing analogue for A.I. sys-
tems: the legal treatment of agents and their principals. A.I. systems have long 
been described by both A.I. developers and academics as autonomous “agents” 
                                                        
111  See supra Section I.B. 
112  Steve Bates, Automation Is Killing, Creating and Transforming Jobs, SOC. FOR HUM. 
RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-
acquisition/pages/automation-killing-creating-transforming-jobs.aspx [https://perma.cc/TK9 
Q-AA9T]. 
113  Id. 
114  Matthew U. Scherer et al., How to Manage Staffing & Morale During Robotics Adop-
tion, ROBOTICS BUS. REV. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/cro/mo 
rale_robotics_adoption/ [https://perma.cc/7G2C-RRS5]. 
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in a non-legal sense.115 In A.I. parlance, the term “agent” denotes a certain level 
of autonomy, in the sense that an agent has the ability to perceive aspects of its 
environment and act upon that environment to carry out a specified task.116 In 
law, the concept of agency revolves less around the characteristics of the agent 
per se and more on the nature of the agent’s relationship with its principal: 
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of con-
sent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to 
his control, and consent by the other so to act. 
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal. 
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.117 
An agent can be general, where the agent is “authorized to conduct a series 
of transactions involving a continuity of service,” as in the case of most em-
ployees, or special, where the agent is “authorized to conduct a single transac-
tion or a series of transactions not involving continuity of service.”118 
For several reasons, agency law would supply a particularly attractive 
framework for the legal status of A.I. systems.119 First, an agent can bind or 
create liability for a principal even if the agent itself lacks the capacity to sue, 
be sued, or enter into contracts, as in the case of children or the legally incom-
petent.120 A principal thus can be held liable for the acts of an agent even in in-
stances where the agent could not be held liable for those acts. Consequently, 
the fact that A.I. systems are not legal “persons” would present no barrier to 
treating them as agents of the persons or entities who created or deployed 
them.121 
                                                        
115  RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 106, at viii, 34 (describing the concept of an “intelligent 
agent” as the “main unifying theme” of the book, and defining an “agent” as “anything that 
can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and acting upon that environ-
ment through actuators.”). 
116  Id. at 34–36. 
117  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
118  Id. § 3. 
119  The focus here is on tort liability rather than contract liability, as the ability of an A.I. 
system to form an enforceable contract involves conceptually distinct issues that are beyond 
the scope of this article. For a general discussion of contracts in which algorithms may de-
termine a party’s obligations, see generally Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128 (2017). 
120  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“It is not 
necessary for an agent, as to the action taken, to have capacity to hold legal rights or be sub-
ject to liabilities.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 21 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) 
(“One whom a court has adjudged mentally incompetent but who retains volition, or one 
who has been deprived of civil rights, has power to affect the principal as fully as if he had 
complete capacity.”). 
121  Much of hornbook agency law is devoted to the distinctions between “express” and “im-
plied” agency and “actual” and “apparent” authority. See, e.g., 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency §§ 14–
16, 64–75. These distinctions are substantively immaterial in terms of the principal’s legal 
responsibility for the agent’s acts; principals are liable for the acts of implied agents and 
agents possessing merely apparent authority to the same degree as express agents with actual 
authority. See, e.g., id. § 71 (“Once established, apparent authority of an agent is the equiva-
lent of expressly conferred authority as to third parties.”). The primary technical distinction 
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In addition, A.I. systems are likely to have had multiple entities involved in 
their design (and the design of their constituent hardware and software compo-
nents), deployment, and operation. Under agency law, an agent can have multi-
ple principals, either by being the agent of another agent (a status known as 
“subagency”) or by being the agent of two or more co-principals.122 Each prin-
cipal can be held responsible for the agent’s tortious acts, as long as those acts 
are otherwise within the scope of the agency.123 In the context of A.I. systems, 
this structure expands the range of potential sources for compensation if an A.I. 
system causes harm beyond the strictly limited number of people who can be 
held responsible for the acts of animals or children. 
With that as background, A.I. systems could be deemed agents, with the 
system’s designers, manufacturers, and developers—i.e., those who gave the 
A.I. system the ability to do legally meaningful things—being the principals. 
As with human agents, an A.I. system could be either a general agent or a spe-
cial agent, depending on the nature and extent of the principal’s input into the 
A.I. system’s design and operations. 
From that point, the principals could be held liable for the A.I. agent’s acts 
under those circumstances where liability would attach under agency law. 
Those circumstances include: 
(1) when the agent engages in tortious conduct while acting in the scope of 
the agent’s authority;124 
(2) when the principal is negligent in selecting, supervising or controlling 
the agent;125 and 
(3) when the principal delegates the duty to supervise or control and the 
delegatee fails to perform those tasks adequately.126 
Taken together, these rules provide a viable framework for assigning liabil-
ity for A.I.-caused harm. 
For the first type of principal liability, the scope of agency authority could 
be defined in terms of the A.I. system’s capabilities and the precautions that the 
system’s upstream designers and deployers took to prevent downstream opera-
                                                                                                                                
is that there are circumstances under which a principal is directly liable for the acts of an 
agent with actual authority but may only be vicariously liable if an agent’s authority was 
merely apparent. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(direct liability for tortious acts of an actual agent), with id. § 7.08 (vicarious liability for tor-
tious acts of an apparent agent). The framework suggested in this section would be to bypass 
these various distinctions and declare that A.I. systems are, by operation of law, agents of the 
persons that develop or deploy them, and are therefore liable for the system’s acts so long as 
it is within the scope of the system’s capabilities at the time the person ceased to have con-
trol over its development and operations. 
122  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 3.14–3.16 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
123  See id. § 7.03 cmt. d. 
124  Id. §§ 7.04, 7.08. 
125  Id. § 7.05. 
126  Id. § 7.06. 
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tors and users from expanding or altering those capabilities.127 “Capabilities” 
here refers to the tasks that an A.I. system already can perform at the time of 
initial operation (call these “primary capabilities”) and, in the case of systems 
with machine learning capabilities, the tasks that the system can learn to per-
form with exposure to new data or environments (call these “learnable capabili-
ties”) without further human modification of its programming or physical com-
ponents (except for modifications that are offered or supported by the 
principal). The designer of an A.I. system would be excused from liability only 
if a downstream individual or entity modifies the system in a manner that 
makes it capable of performing tasks that go beyond even its learnable capabili-
ties. In all other instances, the system’s acts would be deemed to be within the 
scope of the “agency” bestowed on it by its designers and operators. 
For example, say that Designer creates The Identifier, a system capable of 
performing human identification, and markets it to a wide range of potential 
clients. Designer initially trains the system to recognize only the most immedi-
ately visible characteristics of a person—e.g., height, weight, hair color, and 
skin color—and distinguish individuals on that basis. Designer expects that the 
clients who purchase the systems will train the system to distinguish between 
more specific categories of people based on characteristics relevant to the con-
text in which the system will be used. 
Say that Retailer, a store that has suffered losses from a string of thefts, 
purchases The Identifier and not only trains it to identify known shoplifters, but 
also modifies the system so that it immediately deploys a stun probe against 
any individual identified as a known shoplifter. In this case, Designer would 
not be liable for anyone unlawfully stunned because modifying the system to 
stun people was neither something that The Identifier was designed to do nor 
something that it “learned” to do in accordance with its initial programming. 
On the other hand, the second principle would ensure that a company could 
still be held responsible for harm caused by modified versions of its A.I. sys-
tems if the modifications were foreseeable and the company failed to provide 
safeguards against potentially dangerous modifications. Under agency law, 
those types of failures could be cast as negligence in training, supervising, 
and/or controlling the agent—and a principal cannot escape liability for such 
negligence by claiming that supervisory responsibility had been delegated to a 
subagent or third party.128 Thus, Designer would be liable if Retailer used The 
Identifier to engage in racial profiling, unless Designer had explicitly provided 
warnings that declared any such use of the system to be unauthorized and taken 
                                                        
127  “Upstream” and “downstream” refer to the stream of commerce, wherein, for example, a 
parts supplier is “upstream” from the manufacturer of the finished product, which is in turn 
upstream from the wholesaler, which is upstream from the retailer, and so on until the sys-
tem reaches the end user. See Upstream, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2003); Downstream, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2003). 
128  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
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reasonable care to ensure that The Identifier would not be used for that purpose. 
Using this structure, the developers of A.I. systems would effectively have a 
nondelegable duty to control and supervise systems that are modifiable by 
downstream parties. 
An obvious analogy can be drawn here with the principles of products lia-
bility, where such failures to warn and failures to make safe are defects for 
which the manufacturers and sellers of the product can be held strictly liable.129 
But, for the reasons stated in the above discussion on the analogy to prod-
ucts,130 strict liability is too blunt an instrument for a technology as inherently 
malleable as learning A.I. systems. Agency’s negligence-based approach would 
still impose a duty on principals (i.e., designers and operators of A.I. systems) 
to ensure that the system operates safely, but it would only impose liability if 
those entities failed to exercise reasonable care in doing so. 
Looking to agency law rather than products liability for a legal analogy 
makes sense on a more fundamental level as well. The goods that are the sub-
ject of the law governing products liability are not expected to possess autono-
my or intelligence or to use discretion or judgment in carrying out a specified 
task. Agency law, by contrast, fully contemplates that agents will possess intel-
ligence and may have varying levels of discretion in choosing how to carry out 
a task assigned by the principal. Agency law further contemplates that an agent 
may choose to carry out the task in a manner that deviates from the principal’s 
expectations—and sometimes in a manner that runs directly contrary to the 
principal’s instructions. That framework is better suited to the legal and ethical 
questions surrounding responsibility for A.I.-caused harm than laws governing 
devices that are expected to do nothing more than mechanistically carry out a 
human-specified action. 
One possible objection to an agency-based approach is that, like products 
liability, it still could lead to the designers of even clearly innocuous A.I. sys-
tems and components being held liable for harms that could never have oc-
curred without downstream modifications. Here, the before-mentioned princi-
ples of multiple agency would control. If a designer sells or deploys a system 
that it knows or should know downstream users may try to modify, then each 
downstream party that acquires the system from the designer could be treated 
as the designer’s agents. Both legally and morally, this seems perfectly fair, 
since by providing a readily modifiable system, the designer may be deemed to 
have effectively given the downstream party authority to make modifications to 
the A.I. system. If a system is then sold or distributed to additional parties fur-
ther downstream, those downstream parties would become subagents. 
Assuming that these downstream parties themselves possess legal person-
hood and capacity, the rules governing when an agent’s acts are attributable to 
a principal would determine upstream parties’ liability. The upstream party 
                                                        
129  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b)–(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
130  See supra Section III.A. 
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would be excused from liability if the modifications went beyond the scope of 
the downstream party’s authority to use and modify the A.I. system; such a 
modification would break the chain of agency relationships for upstream par-
ties. The upstream party then could be held liable only if it was itself negligent 
in providing the system to the downstream party or in failing to limit that par-
ty’s ability to use and modify the system. This agency-inspired framework 
would strike a balance between ensuring that victims receive compensation and 
protecting designers and sellers of A.I. systems from liability for harm that re-
sults from transformations (as opposed to mere implementations) of their tech-
nologies. 
In addition, the framework is sufficiently flexible that it could readily be 
adapted if future advances in A.I. technology make some form of A.I. person-
hood desirable. If some A.I. systems attain personhood, the legal system could 
simply cease treating such A.I. systems as a special class of agent, and would 
instead treat them merely as additional downstream agents. Agency’s agnosti-
cism on the issue of legal personhood thus would allow this framework to re-
main effective regardless of whether A.I. systems are granted some form of 
personhood. 
CONCLUSION 
We live in a society that is in no way ready or willing to accept A.I. per-
sonhood. A.I. systems have not yet reached a level where personhood would 
make economic—much less ethical—sense. But the current imprudence of cre-
ating A.I. personhood may be a function of the current state of the technology. 
These are still early days in the history of A.I. and many of the same objections 
that are commonly expressed about granting personhood to A.I.—most notably 
that it would discourage people from taking responsibility for their creations—
were also said about the then-novel concept of corporate personhood in the 
19th century. Gilbert and Sullivan even wrote an operetta—“Utopia Limited”—
whose plot revolved around the chicanery and lack of responsibility that wide-
spread adoption of the corporate form could wreak.131 Those objections have 
never completely gone away, but nevertheless the idea of corporate personhood 
is firmly entrenched. Society has grudgingly accepted the legal fiction of corpo-
rate personhood because humans retain ultimate control over a corporation’s 
actions and because the corporate structure encourages investment and econo-
mies of scale. 
Someday, similar economic and social forces might make A.I. personhood 
more appealing and practical. If, for instance, a government wishes to encour-
age the construction and use of autonomous elder care robots (such as the one 
depicted in the film Robot & Frank)132, it would make sense to come up with a 
legal framework that limits liability for the builders, distributors, and owners of 
                                                        
131  W. S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, UTOPIA LIMITED (1893). 
132  ROBOT & FRANK (Samuel Goldwin Films & Stage 6 Films 2012). 
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those robots. Creating some limited form of artificial personhood would then 
become a more appealing proposition. That appeal will likely increase as A.I. 
systems become more integrated into our economy and society, and gain the 
ability to engage in increasingly more complex acts with increasingly less hu-
man supervision. 
An appropriately flexible legal framework should therefore ensure that vic-
tims have a route to seek redress for A.I.-caused harm regardless of whether the 
A.I. system is considered a legal person; recognize the unique manner in which 
A.I. systems can be designed and developed; account for the impact of autono-
my and learning on the foreseeability of an A.I. system’s behavior; and be suf-
ficiently flexible to incorporate A.I. personhood into its framework should such 
a legal status become desirable in the future. Viewed through that lens, agency 
law provides the most promising analogue. Agency law is agnostic as to 
whether an agent is itself a legal person capable of being sued; a principal’s lia-
bility does not depend on the agent’s personhood. It thus provides a framework 
for handling liability for A.I.-caused harm regardless of whether A.I. systems 
attain personhood. 
Regardless, the rise of A.I. will present the world’s legal systems with their 
greatest conceptual challenge since the Industrial Revolution. Our laws were 
drafted under the assumption that legally significant decisions will be made 
by—and only by—human beings. That fundamental-but-unstated principle will 
break down as legally significant decisions are increasingly automated. But it 
would be foolish to accelerate that inevitable process of legal change. We must 
approach the legal status of A.I. systems with a clear and realistic sense both of 
what the law is and what the law should be. 
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